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This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is submitted by 
Applicant/Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, who urges this Court to 
accept Certiorari in this matter. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 . Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46 (d), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on the grounds that Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) profoundly changes and 
disrupts the long standing practice and standards governing the 
referral of industrial claims to Medical Panels. 
2. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46 (c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on the grounds that Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) radically departs form 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings concerning 
the preservation of issues for appeal, so as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioner seeks review by Petition for Writ of Certiorari of 
the Utah Court of Appeals decision Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) (See 
Addendum "A"). 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals from which this 
Petition is taken was filed on June 16, 1993. Petitioner filed a 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition For Writ of 
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Certiorari on July 15, 1993. On July 15, 1993 this Court entered 
an Order Extending Time for Filing, granting Petitioner until 
August 16, 1993 to file this Petition. 
Jurisdiction to consider this Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Article VIII, § 3, of 
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) and 
(5), (1989); and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is the controlling 
statute and Rule R568-1-9(A) of the Utah Administrative Code is the 
controlling Rule governing the issues raised in this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. Copies of said Statute and Rule are attached 
in Addendum "D". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This claim was filed by Applicant/Petitioner for an industrial 
injury he sustained while employed by Airfax Express on September 
25, 1989. (R. at 1). The employer's workers' compensation insurer 
paid temporary total disability benefits from September 26, 1989 
through June 5, 1990, as well as compensation for a 5% permanent 
partial impairment. (R. at 18). 
Petitioner claimed that despite attempts he was unable to 
return to work, that he needed additional medical care, additional 
temporary total compensation and a higher permanent partial 
impairment rating. (R. at 1 ). The Carrier refused those benefits, 
and Mr. Ashcroft filed an Application for Hearing. A formal 
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Hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on May 19, 
1992. (R. at 22) . 
The Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1992, denied the 
claim for additional compensation, medical benefits and impairment 
benefits without referring the matter to a Medical Pa"**- (R. at 
39-46, Addendum "B"). Mr. Ashcroft filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industrial Commission which was subsequently denied on August 
21, 1992 (R. at 69-80, Addendum "C"). 
He filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the Industrial Commissions refusal to convene a 
Medical Panel, but which remanded the case to the Industrial 
Commission to "conduct a review employing the proper standard of 
preponderance of the evidence." (Addendum "A"). 
STATEMENT 
There is no dispute as to the basic facts of Mr. Ashcroft's 
industrial injury. An initial period of compensation and medical 
treatment were in fact paid. This dispute arises because the 
insurance carrier discontinued all benefits before the Petitioner 
had reached maximum medical improvement, and because the treating 
physicians felt he had a higher impairment than the insurance 
carrier was willing to pay. 
Following his injury on September 25, 1989, and an initial 
evaluation in the emergency room, Mr. Ashcroft was seen and treated 
by his family doctor, Dr. M. K. McGregor, who continued to treat 
him during the following two months. (t at 130-136). Dr. 
McGregor advised complete bed rest and diagnosed him as having a 
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bulging disc/spinal stenosis. (R. at 133). After two months of 
unsuccessful treatment, Dr. McGregor referred the patient to Dr. 
Donald G. Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss initially saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989 and 
diagnosed, "Central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at 
this level." He recommended conservative treatment with physical 
therapy primarily for work hardening, but also had him under 
consideration for surgery. (R. at 146). In December, 1989 Dr. 
Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral leg pain and after 
reviewing a myelogram and CT scan, his diagnoses was "Sciatica-like 
symptoms with central disc herniation and no definite evidence of 
neural impingement." (R. at 150). Dr. Bliss noted that Mr. 
Ashcroft's multiple level disc disease indicated that he has had 
pre-existing problems. (R. at 151). On February 2, 1990, in 
response to an inquiry for State Vocational Rehabilitation, and to 
the dismay of the insurance adjuster, Dr. Bliss reported that Mr. 
Ashcroft's "... evaluation and treatment are incomplete." (R. at 
153). 
At the behest of the insurance carrier, Mr. Ashcroft's case 
was transferred to Dr. Neal Capel, an orthopedic physician. (R. at 
157-173). Dr. Capel's initial visit notes in reference to the 
insurance adjusters referral instructions state as follows: 
Liberty Mutual account manager determined his 
permanent partial disability as 5%. March 26, 1990, is 
the cutoff of benefits... The patient will have is 
disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his 
work hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks. He will be 
reevaluated on May 13 before he is released for unlimited 
activity. He seems to have had a strong improvement in 
his attitude and seems to be desirous of accepting and 
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working with these provisions. (R. at 158). 
Dr. Capel placed him on a work hardening and conditioning program. 
(R. at 158). 
On May 10, 1990, Mr. Ashcroft experienced intrascapular pain, 
and was treated emergency room. Dr. Capel diagnosed this 
incident as "anxiety reaction with somatization. (R. at 159). 
Dr. Capel continued to recommend general conditioning. (R. at 
159) i 5, 1990, Dr. Capel's office notes state, "... The 
patient has no change in his status and was given a work release. 
(R. at 160). 
Although he had been released to work Cape] 
Ashcroft continued to have medical problems and Dr. Capel continued 
to give medical treatment, the last visit being March 15, 1991. 
Petitioner complained that sitting made him uncomfortable and that 
he had aching muscles (R. at 161), He reported low back pain in 
November 1990 after he lifted two or three pieces of firewood. In 
March 19* Mr. Ashcroft reported back pain after he had bent over 
to clean up after his dog, and that he thereafter had difficulty 
straightening up. (R. at 167). Dr. Capel concluded that he had a 
recurrence of iliolumbar strain sprain and noted: 
I further advised him that as far as the Industrial 
Commission is concerned, he is an administrative catch 22 
situation where he cannot force them to assume care of 
his present complaint and while it is possibly associated 
in quality relation, it is a new episode. (R. at 167) 
After that Mr. Ashcroft concluded that he was not going to get 
satisfactory care from Dr. Capel and changed to Dr. D. R. McNaught 
on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that he had severe 
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sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar discs L4, L5 and possible 
L6. He recommended surgery, but surgery was never performed 
because it was discovered that Mr. Ashcroft had AIDS which 
complicated the situation by rendering surgery a more difficult 
option. (R. at 174-175). 
During this period of evaluation, on August 19, 1991, Dr. 
McNaught stated that Mr. Ashcroft was unable to return to work (R. 
at 178). On September 5, 1991, Dr. McNaught reported "Apparently 
he was released from light work at sometime in the past, which I 
feel in retrospect was probable in error, as he does appear to 
require a more aggressive approach to his low back . . .ff (R. at 
179). 
Finally on April 23, 1992, after several other possible 
interventions including chymopapain treatment had been considered 
and ruled out, Dr. McNaught concluded that Mr. Ashcroft had a 10% 
disability rating. (R. at 177). Dr. John Sanders, a consulting 
surgeon for Dr. McNaught, independently rated the permanent 
impairment at 15%. (R. at 191). 
During this period, Mr. Ashcroft also received at his own 
expense chiropractic care from Dr. Randall N. Wageman from 
September 27, 1991, through December, 1991, at which time he was 
forced to terminate treatment for financial reasons. Dr. Wageman 
concluded that Mr. Ashcroft suffered, f,Chronic moderate to severe 
post-traumatic lumbar intervertebral disc syndrome with 
radiculopathy resulting from over-exertion or strenuous movements." 
He further found " an exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries 
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sustained in the original accident" of 1989. (R. at 122). 
Respondents did not have Mr. Ashcroft personally examined by 
a physician of their own choosing, but did have Dr. Boyd Holbrook 
perform a "file review". On April 10 1992, Dr. Holbrook concluded 
on the basis of his examination of the medical records vihich did 
not include the reports of Dr. Wageman, that the majority of Mr. 
Ashcroft's problems were not industrial in nature and that no 
further medical treatment was needed in connection with his 1989 
industrial injury. (R. at 23-31). 
The Administrative Law Judge found that there was not a 
well-supported rating in the record and the 
Administrative Law Judge can only note that a 5% 
impairment is reasonable for an unoperated disc problem 
according to the AMA Guides To The Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Table 53." (R. at 45, Exhibit 
"B"). 
Despite request by Mr. Ashcroft's attorney, the Administrative Law 
Judge refused to refer Mr. Ashcroft to a Medical Panel. (R. at 
47). This refusal was subsequently sustained by the Industrial 
Commission (R at 67, Exhibit "C"). 
Petitioner's claim for additional disability benefits wa#S 
denied by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1992 (R. at 45, 
Exhibit "B"). He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission on July 15, 1992 (R. at 47-54), but it was denied on 
August 21, 1992, (R. at 64-68, Exhibit "C"). 
A R G U M E N T 
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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO RULE 46 (d), UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
ASHCROFT v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 215 UTAH 
ADV. REP. 50 (UTAH APP. 06/16/93) PROFOUNDLY 
CHANGES AND DISRUPTS THE LONG STANDING 
PRACTICE AND STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REFERRAL 
OF INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS TO MEDICAL PANELS. 
It would be difficult to underestimate the value and 
importance of a Medical Panel referral to an injured workers. The 
workers' compensation system is predicated upon being an 
expeditious and inexpensive method for resolving industrial claims. 
If injured workers were required to obtain detailed and 
comprehensive medical reports documenting their injuries and the 
resulting degree of disability, many like Petitioner, would not 
obtain the compensation to which they are entitled. 
The Court of Appeals decision in Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) establishes 
a precedent overturning a longstanding Industrial Commission 
practice of referring claims to a Medical Panel on the basis of 
short summary medical reports which do not exhaustively discuss 
medical causation. Injured workers are only required to 
demonstrate a prima facia case and it is the Medical Panel report 
which is relied upon to provide a detailed review of the injury and 
the resulting disability, if any. In addition, the Court of 
Appeals also failed to address other statutory basis for referrals 
to Panels. If the Court of Appeals decision in this case is 
allowed to stand unmodified, it will severely restrict the injured 
workers' access to Medical Panels and their corresponding ability 
to obtain the full compensation to which they are otherwise 
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entitled. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) provides as 
follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed 
by the commission. 
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by 
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to 
refer this matter to a Medical Panel, Respondent Utah Industrial 
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as 
follows: 
the Applicant has failed to show medical and legal 
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel 
is necessary. (R. at 45). 
While that argument might have some merit in the initial 
formulation of policy, it has none in the execution of the policy 
presently contained in statute, rules and regulations. It is 
expressly to determine medical causation and degree of disability 
that referrals to Medical Panels are made. 
Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the 
"necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1 . One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
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shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or, 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit D. 
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when 
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved". The 
Court of Appeals recognized this important principal when it noted: 
... Thus, the rule requires the Commission to convene a 
medical panel when the evidence supports conflicting 
industrial impairment ratings with more than a five 
percent difference. If the evidence regarding impairment 
ratings supports ratings that vary by more than five 
percent, as petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be 
necessary to resolve the differences. 
In short, the statute explicitly grants discretion 
to the Commission as to whether to convene a medical 
panel. The Commission, in turn, restricted its own 
discretion by promulgating the Rule requiring it to 
convene a medical panel in certain instances. .Id. at 51. 
The rule does not, as the Court of Appeals implies, provide 
that a Medical Panel will only be convened when the injured worker 
has already proved both medical and legal causation. Rather the 
Rules states that a Panel will be used when there are "significant 
medical issues involved". The Rule specifically states that 
significant medical issues are involved when there are any of the 
following; conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person, a disparity 
of more than 90 days on the temporary total cutoff date or more 
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than $2,000 in medical expenses in controversy. 
It can not be seriously disputed that this case clearly 
contains conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary by more than 5% of the whole person. Dr. 
Holbrook gave Mr. Ashcroft a zero % impairment. (R. at 23-31), Dr. 
McNaught rated the Petitioner at 10% impairment of the whole person 
(R. at 177), and Dr. Sanders indicated that he had a 15% whole 
person rating (R. at 191), a difference of 15%. 
It little matters that Respondents believe that the doctor's 
ratings are "not well supported" (R. at 37). It appears that at 
least Dr. McNaught did not extensively document his 10% rating 
because the insurance carrier told him that they agreed with it. 
(R. at 177). In such a case, Dr. McNaught reasonably concluded 
that he would not have to give all of his subsidiary findings which 
led him to conclude that the Petitioner had a 10% impairment. 
Respondents should be estopped from attacking the lack of detailed 
support for the disability ratings when they were responsible for 
the omission of that support. 
The Rule does not say that referral will occur only when the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that there are "well supported 
conflicting medical reports;" rather it states that referral will 
occur even when there are merely "conflicting medical reports". 
(emphasis added). It is, in fact, to determine the validity of the 
initial medical reports that referrals are required to Medical 
Panels when there is more than a 5% variance in the impairment 
ratings. 
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The Administrative Law Judge adopted a finding of 5% whole 
person permanent impairment with absolutely no factual support in 
the record. None of the many doctors who examined Mr. Ashcroft or 
his records ever assigned a 5% rating. The only support in the 
record for a 5% rating is the determination of the insurance 
carrier's account manager in April 1990 that 5% was appropriate. 
(R. at 158). 
There was also "conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days" as 
provided in section (A)(1)(b) of the Administrative Rule. Dr. 
Capel gave the Petitioner a work release on June 5, 1990 (R. at 
160) and that is the date Respondents have relied on for the cutoff 
of temporary total compensation. However, Dr. McNaught on 
September 5, 1991, well over a year later stated without 
qualification that that date was in error. (R. at 179). Clearly 
there is a dispute as to the appropriate temporary total cutoff 
date which vary by far more than the mere 90 days provided in the 
Rule. This is another issue on which the assistance of a Medical 
Panel was essential and required under the Rule. 
Finally, there are medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000.00, as required by the Rule. The 
Administrative Law Judge made no findings on this issue, however 
the record does specifically document that there is at least 
$4,000.00 in disputed medical bills. (R. at 116). In addition, 
Mr. Ashcroft needs additional medical care which Respondents have 
refused to authorize. 
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The conflict in the medical reports and concern over legal and 
medical causation is why referral to a Medical Panel is required in 
the circumstances presented here and the failure to do so is more 
than an abuse of discretion-it is plain error. See Lipman v. 
Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979) and Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the 
former Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made 
referrals to Medical Panels mandatory in cases of denied liability. 
Although reference to a Medical Panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory in some 
circumstances by the Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah 
Administrative Code R568-1-9). The Court of Appeals properly 
recognized the manditory nature of the Rule. 
The failure to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such 
referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where 
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event 
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer 
the case to a Medical Panel may be an abuse of discretion.11 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 
(Utah 1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 
1986). 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Petitioner's claims for additional compensation and 
medical care, if not clear, was at least uncertain and failure to 
refer the matter to a Medical Panel was error. 
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The Court of Appeals Opinion sustaining the refusual to refer 
this matter to a Medical Panel should at the least be reversed and 
the matter remanded with directions to convene a Medical Panel 
since failure to do was in direct conflict with Industrial 
Commission practice and rule. The failure to obtain a Medical 
Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking 
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitioner's 
claim. 
In holding that a referral to a Medical Panel was not required 
that Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
Here, the Commission determined: 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in 
connection with his assertion that a 15 
percent rating was appropriate, was supported 
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic. 
We need some justification, and in the absence 
of such, we cannot speculate. In the case of 
Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to 
any appropriate rating, other than a statement 
that the adjustor had decided upon a five 
percent rating. We therefore conclude that 
the evidence does not support the applicant in 
this regard. 
In short, the Commission found no specific or supported 
impairment rating in the record, much less conflicting 
impairment ratings. Nor did the Commission find that the 
ratings given related to an industrial cause. Thus, 
there was no departure from the agency rule because the 
agency rule did not apply. Therefore, we need not 
consider whether any departure was reasonable and 
rational. Id., at 51. 
The error in this holding is that the analysis is incomplete. 
Even if one accepts the Court of Appeals rational in regards to the 
disparity in the ratings, (which Petitioner argues below is 
unreasonable), the Court of Appeals complete failed to even address 
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the other two independent basis for manditory referral to a Medial 
Panel, i.e., conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total 
cutoff date which vary by more than 90 days and medical expenses in 
controversy amounting to more than $2,000.00. Either of those two 
basis would independently justify and require the referral to a 
Panel. 
The Court of Appeals decision is faulty for not engaging in 
complete analysis and ignoring and failing to even address two of 
the three basis under which referral is required. One need not 
even examine the disparity in the ratings since referral was 
required due to conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary 
total cutoff date and medical expenses amounting to more than 
$2,000.00. 
In regards to the ratings however, the Industrial Commissions 
analysis which the Court of Appeals adopts is flawed. The 
Industrial Commission has never required comprehensive medical 
reports in order to support a referral to a Medical Panel. In 
fact, the long standing Industrial Commission practice is to rely 
on "Summary Medical Reports" which are really just fill-in-the-
blank forms, which only ask the Doctor to supply a rating without 
the necessity for detailed support. The Industrial Commission 
produces a form for just this purpose, a copy of which is included 
in the Addendum as Exhibit "E". The purpose of these initial 
ratings is simply to determine whether a Panel should be convened. 
It is the Medical Panel report which requires "detailed medical 
analysis and reasoning". The Industrial Commission can not print, 
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supply and require the use of "Summary Medical Reports" and then 
disavow their use to support referral to a Medical Panel. 
In addition, the Commission and the Court of Appeals 
completely ignore Dr. McNaught's 10% rating, which goes without 
challenge. The 15% rating by Dr. Sanders is dismissed as allegedly 
not supported by medical analysis or logic. That allegation is not 
supported by the medical report of Dr. Sanders. It should be 
remembered that Dr. Sanders was brought in only as a consulting 
surgeon for Dr. McNaught, and his rating of 15% was based on Dr. 
McNaught's findings and reports. Dr. Capel either determined that 
he could not at that time rate Mr. Ashcroft or give him a 5% 
rating. The insurance carriers, physician, Dr. Holbrook on the 
basis of an incomplete file review and without the benefit of 
personally examining Mr. Ashcroft gives him a zero % impairment. 
Clearly there are conflicting medical opinions which vary by more 
than 5%. 
II. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO RULE 46 (C), UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
ASHCROFT V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 215 UTAH 
ADV. REP. 50 (UTAH APP. 06/16/93) RADICALLY 
DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL SO AS TO 
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 
POWER OF SUPERVISION. 
The Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
We first consider the threshold issue of whether 
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Ashcroft properly preserved for review the issues he now 
raises, namely issues of sufficiency of the evidence, 
standard of proof and adequacy of the ALJ's findings, 
given that he failed to raise these issues before the 
Commission. 
* * * 
Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues before the 
Commission. Of those issues, all except for his claim 
that the Commission employed the wrong standard of proof, 
are claims that could have been presented to the 
Commission. See id. Thus, we deem that Ashcroft has 
waived the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and 
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he cannot now 
raise them for the first time of petition for judicial 
review. Id., at 50. 
The rational for this rule is that by raising an issue at the 
administrative level, "either the administrative law judge or the 
Commission could have adjudicated the issue." Pease v. Industrial 
Commission, 694 P. 2d 613 (Utah 1984). 
Petitioner actually raised five (5) specific alleged errors in 
his Motion for Review, namely; (1) Rejection by the ALJ of two 
permanent partial disability ratings in favor of a two year old 
rating done by the "Liberty Mutual account manager." (2) The 
failure of the ALJ to order that a Medical Panel be convened to 
consider among other items the question of maximum medical 
improvement. (3) The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors 
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not 
decided upon a course of treatment. (4) The ALJ lost or ignored 
the chiropractor's results that the applicant was improving with 
chiropractic treatment, and (5) This case contains objective 
evidence of several radiographically verified disc injuries, and 
surgery was a clear possibility but for the complication of the 
AIDS. 
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While Petitioner did not specifically use the precise words of 
"sufficiency of the evidence" and the "inadequacy of the ALJ's 
findings", the substance of those arguments and challenges to the 
ALJ's Order were in fact made to the Commission. It is impossible 
to consider the five (5) points Petitioner raised in his Motion for 
Review as anything less than a full attack on the ALJ's findings 
and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. 
The Utah Industrial Commission clearly believed that 
Petitioner was challenging the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings. 
The Commission spends considerable time addressing the ALJ's 
findings and demonstrating that they were sufficient. In fact the 
concluding paragraph of the Denial of Motion for Review is as 
follows: 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's 
findings, conclusions of law, and order were based upon 
substantial evidence in light of the entire record, and 
the legal conclusions were correct. The applicant has 
failed to prove his case. Id. at 4. 
Thus the purpose of the Rule was clearly met in this case, as the 
Industrial Commission was put on notice of the specific claims that 
Petitioner later raised before the Court of Appeals and the 
Commission not only "could have adjudicated the issue", it did in 
fact fully address and adjudicate those issues. Even the Court of 
Appeals goes into some depth as to the sufficiency of the ALJ's 
findings. 
Petitioner should not be precluded from raising an issue on 
appeal merely because the Court of Appeals does not believe that he 
specifically phrased it in the manner they would prefer. Form 
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should not prevail over substance. The Rules of Appellate 
procedure provide that "The statement of a question presented will 
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included 
therein". Rule 49 (a)(4) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Strict pleading practice should not be applied in workers' 
compensation cases as such severe formality would make it 
impossible for a worker to pursue his or her own case without an 
attorney. The essence of the workers' compensation system is that 
it is a "user friendly" system without excessive procedural 
requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision in Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, is flawed as having not considered and addressed 
all of the issues properly raised by Petitioner. The Court of 
Appeals properly recognized that Rule R568-1-9(A) requires the 
Industrial Commission to convene a Medical Panel in three specific 
instances. Petitioner alleged that he met all three independent 
and alternative basis for referral to a Panel, however the Court of 
Appeals only addressed one, namely whether there was a 5% disparity 
in permanent impairment ratings. The Court did not even consider 
the issues of entitlement to temporary total compensation and 
medical bills in excess of $2,000.00 which independantly warrented 
the convening of a Medical Panel. Even on the ratings issue the 
Court failed to consider or address Dr. McNaught's 10% rating, 
which when contrasted against Dr. Holbrook's zero % rating created 
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the required disparity of more than 5%. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in dismissing Petitioners 
ratings as being without analysis, ignores and undermines 
longstanding practice fostered by the Industrial Commissions own 
form of "Summary Medical Records", which does not require analysis 
but merely asks for a rating. Under the Rule in effect any medical 
report in which the worker's medical provider states an opinion as 
to a rating should be deemed sufficient evidence to establish a 
dispute for the purpose of convening a Medical Panel, if the 
dispute is significant under Rule R568-1-9. 
Finally, Petitioner did properly challenge the Administrative 
Law Judges findings before the Industrial Commission. His multiple 
challenges in his Motion for Review can only be viewed as a full 
assault on the Administrative Law Judges findings. Although stated 
in general terms, the Industrial Commission was put on notice and 
did in fact adjudicate the issue. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft respectfully request 
that this Court accept Certiorari and that the decision Ashcroft v. 
Industrial Commission be reversed in so far as it concerns the 
terms under which a Medical Panel must be convened and the 
Petitioner's duty to preserve issues for appeal. 
DATED this I(pfli day of August, 1993. 
BRUCE J. WZLSON, ESQ. 
Attorney itorJ Applicant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
Utah Court of Appeals decision Ashcroft v. 
Industrial Commission. 
ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order (June 29, 1992). 
Order Denying Motion for Review (August 21, 1992). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988). 
Rule R568-1-9 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
Summary Medical Record form. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, seeks review by this court of an 
Industrial Commission order denying him workers compensation 
benefits. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
On September 25, 1989, Ashcroft sustained an industrial 
injury while unloading freight from a truck. The employer7s 
compensation insurer paid temporary total disability benefits 
from September 26, 1989 through June 5, 1990 as well as 
compensation for a five percent permanent partial impairment. 
On September 26, 1991, Ashcroft petitioned for additional 
temporary disability compensation, an increased permanent partial 
disability rating and medical expenses. Ashcroft alleged that 
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the same September 25, 1989 industrial injury rendered him unable 
to work. 
After a formal hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
denied Ashcroft's claim. The ALJ did not convene a medical 
panel, despite a request by both parties7 counsel to do so. The 
ALJ discounted conclusory statements of two expert witnesses 
regarding Ashcroft's impairment ratings: 
Dr. Capel merely recites what the insurance 
adjustor was offering and postpones a rating; 
Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 
15% without reference to any underlying facts 
or industrial cause. 
The ALJ made findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
the Commission essentially adopted. She determined that "the 
true cause of [Ashcroft's] continuing problems stem from pre-
existing degenerative problems, intervening non-industrial 
events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore, his claim 
fails for lack of medical and legal causation." 
Ashcroft moved the Industrial Commission for review. In his 
motion, Ashcroft failed to raise issues regarding sufficiency of 
the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings, concentrating 
his administrative appeal on the ALJ's refusal to convene a 
medical panel. The Commission, after adopting the ALJ's 
findings, affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits. Ashcroft now 
seeks review of the Commission's denial. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
We first consider the threshold issue of whether Ashcroft 
properly preserved for review the issues he now raises, namely 
issues of sufficiency of the evidence, standard of proof and 
adequacy of the ALJ's findings, given that he failed to raise 
these issues before the Commission. 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) is 
dispositive. The Pease court held that a petitioner, in moving 
for review, has "the obligation to raise all the issues that 
could have been presented at that time, and those issues not 
raised [are] waived." Id. at 616; accord Smallwood v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 841 P.2d 716, 718 n.l (Utah App. 1992). The rationale is 
that by raising an issue at the administrative level, "either the 
administrative law judge or the Commission could have adjudicated 
the issue." Pease, 694 P.2d at 616. 
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Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues before the 
Commission. Of those issues, all except for his claim that the 
Commission employed the wrong standard of proof, are claims that 
could have been presented to the Commission. See id. Thus, we 
deem that Ashcroft has waived the issues of sufficiency of the 
evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he cannot 
now raise them for the first time on petition for judicial 
review. Id. Ashcroft could not have raised the claim that the 
Commission employed the wrong standard of proof until after the 
Commission had made its review. Thus, this claim is properly 
before this court even though it is raised for the first time on 
judicial review. 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
Ashcroft claims the Commission applied the wrong standard of 
proof when it denied his motion for review. In its review of the 
ALJ's decision, the Commission employed the phrase "substantial 
evidence." This is not the correct standard. The quantum of 
evidence required to prove compensability is a preponderance of 
the evidence. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616, 618 
(Utah 1979). 
The distinction between preponderance of evidence and 
substantial evidence is significant. A reviewing body, such as 
this court, applies the standard of substantial evidence to 
examine whether the record contains evidence supporting the 
findings made by the trier of fact. The reviewing court does not 
weigh the evidence. In contrast, a trier of fact, including the 
Commission, determines whether the petitioner has met his or her 
burden of proof, the standard being preponderance of the 
evidence. The Commissions mistake as to the standard of proof 
is not one of mere phraseology. Both Ashcroft and this court are 
entitled to know that his proof was evaluated under the correct 
standard. 
We therefore remand the claim for the Commission to evaluate 
it under the standard of preponderance of the evidence. 
MEDICAL PANEL 
Ashcroft claims the Commission acted unreasonably and 
irrationally in not convening a medical panel. Ashcroft 
preserved this issue by including it in his motion for review 
before the Commission. See Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 
613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
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The "Commission may refer the medical aspects of [a workers 
compensation] case to a medical panel appointed by the 
Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(a) (1992) (emphasis 
added). This statutory language is permissive, not mandatory. 
See Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992). 
Pursuant to section 35-1-77(1)(a), the Commission enacted 
Rule 568-1-9 as a guideline in determining if a medical panel 
should be convened. In contrast to the statute, the wording of 
the agency rule is mandatory: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the 
Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues 
may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary more 
than 5% of the whole person, . . . . 
Utah Code Admin. P. R568-1-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the rule 
requires the Commission to convene a medical panel when the 
evidence supports conflicting industrial impairment ratings with 
more than a five percent difference. If the evidence regarding 
impairment ratings supports ratings that vary by more than five 
percent, as petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be 
necessary to resolve the differences. 
In short, the statute explicitly grants discretion to the 
Commission as to whether to convene a medical panel. The 
Commission, in turn, restricted its own discretion by 
promulgating the Rule requiring it to convene a medical panel in 
certain instances. 
Our review is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(ii) (1987) because this issue requires us to consider 
whether the agency acted contrary to its own rule. Thus, "we 
will not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of 
the [rule] unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
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reasonableness and rationality." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah App. 1993).l 
Here, the Commission determined: 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in 
connection with his assertion that a 15 
percent rating was appropriate, was supported 
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic. 
We need some justification, and in the 
absence of such, we cannot speculate. In the 
case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by 
him as to any appropriate rating, other than 
a statement that the adjustor had decided 
upon a five percent rating. We therefore 
conclude that the evidence does not support 
the applicant in this regard. 
In short, the Commission found no specific or supported 
impairment rating in the record, much less conflicting impairment 
ratings. Nor did the Commission find that the ratings given 
related to an industrial cause. Thus, there was no departure 
from the agency rule because the agency rule did not apply. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether any departure was 
reasonable and rational. 
CONCLUSION 
Ashcroft could have, but failed to raise the issues of 
sufficiency of the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings. 
We therefore deem that he has waived those issues. We affirm the 
ALJ's refusal to convene a medical panel as reasonable and 
rational because the ALJ found no specific or supported 
impairment rating in the record. On the other hand, we cannot 
affirm the Commission's decision because the Commission employed 
the wrong standard of proof in its review of the evidence. We 
therefore reverse the Commission's order and remand for the 
1. In the event we determine an agency has in fact departed from 
its own rule, we would then consider whether the departure was 
reasonable and rational. King. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34-35; Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii); SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham J., 
dissenting) ("courts also should uphold reasonable and rational 
departures from agency rules absent a showing by the party 
challenging the departure that the departure violated some other 
right.") (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1992)). 
920586-CA 5 
Commission to conduct a review employing the proper standard of 
preponderance of the evidence. 
sed in part, and remanded, 
^6gnaT W. Garff, Judg 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregor^j/iC. Orme, Judge 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Commission Conference Room, Washington County 
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Bruce 
Wilson, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for additional temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89 
industrial injury. The defendant insurance carrier denies 
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as 
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He 
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury. 
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On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a 
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and 
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his 
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer. 
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the 
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and 
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took 
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room. 
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle 
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available 
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St. 
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on 
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete 
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's 
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and 
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and 
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal 
stenosis at this level." He recommended conservative treatment. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.) 
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing 
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He 
stated his impression was M. . . sciatica-like symptoms with 
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural 
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a 
neurological consult. 
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a 
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and 
noted " . . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder 
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine 
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram 
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without 
definite stenosis." Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, ". 
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from 
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates 
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is 
not his major complaint at this time." (Ex. D-l, p. 24.) 
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as 
". . . medically stable for return to limited employment in non-
laboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified 
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that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late 
1989, due to a prior lien. 
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic 
physician, Dr. Neal Capel. Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and 
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes 
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, " . . . Liberty Mutual 
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%, 
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have 
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work 
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.) 
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel 
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for 
intrascapular pain and noted, "... The most likely explanation is 
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to 
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning. 
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ". 
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work 
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was 
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.) 
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following 
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work, 
but began attending school at Dixie College. 
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that 
sitting required by the applicants school activities was making 
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the 
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft7s anxiety symptoms. 
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in 
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr. 
Capel's notes state, ". . .He has found that the back did fairly 
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on 
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn. 
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.) 
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that 
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of 
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes 
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft 
lifted firewood and had, " . . . sudden onset of low back pain..." 
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back 
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him 
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his 
fireplace. 
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At his January 29, 1991, office visit, the applicant reported 
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again 
during Christmas and experienced leg aches. He requested a 
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it 
due to side effects. 
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr. 
Capel reported another episode of back pain: "The patient has been 
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent 
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain 
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight." Dr. 
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of 
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . .1 further advised him that as 
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an 
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to 
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly 
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p. 
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and 
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening 
up. 
Following Dr. Capel'& treatment, the applicant was examined by 
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that 
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar 
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant 
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some 
reservations about that approach. 
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical 
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that 
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.) 
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the 
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into 
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant 
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992, 
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from 
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also 
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and 
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression. 
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for 
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several 
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that 
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no 
reference to the AIDS factors. Dr. Sanders also wrote a one 
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my 
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that 
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on 
that basis alone." (Ex. D-l, p. 66.) 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's 
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems 
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, ". . 
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease 
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being 
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a 
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex." Dr. Holbrook 
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection 
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, ". . .it does not appear that 
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in 
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain 
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67). 
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St. 
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received 
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35 
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an 
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the 
original accident," of 1989 (Ex. A-l). 
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone 
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: x-
rays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI 
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91). 
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and 
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache 
medicines. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately 
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary 
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally 
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to 
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing 
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening 
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore, 
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation. 
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that 
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional 
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he 
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact, 
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery 
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss, 
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable. 
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers 
compensation law is specific on this issue, ". . . Once a claimant 
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary 
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary 
benefits." Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiffs burden to prove, 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah 
1988) . 
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to 
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic" stage of his 
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records 
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the 
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least 
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test 
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is 
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS 
condition, which may not have become a ". . .severe medical 
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to 
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery, 
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment. 
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the 
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when 
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all 
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident 
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that 
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors 
refused to surgically treat. 
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall 
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition 
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of 
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such 
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of 
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the 
applicant. 
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians 
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving pre-
existing and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant 
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred 
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was 
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents 
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally 
contributing to his continuing back problems• 
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant 
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial 
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge 
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely 
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a 
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without 
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a 
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law 
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an 
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, Denis 
Ashcroft, for additional temporary total disability and medical 
expenses compensation in connection with his industrial injury of 
September 25, 1989, should be and is hereby denied for lack of 
legal and medical causation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Denis Ashcroft, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
* 
Airfax Express, and/or * 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., * 
* 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and 
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total 
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel 
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back 
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ) 
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical 
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial 
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following 
errors: 
1. Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial 
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the 
"Liberty Mutual account manager." 
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel 
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum 
medical improvement. 
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors 
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not 
decided upon a course of treatment. 
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results 
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment. 
5. This case contains objective evidence of several 
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear 
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS." 
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence 
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that 
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the 
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will 
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briefly discuss the pertinent facts as they relate to the 
allegations of error. 
There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the 
original industrial injury in 1989. At that time, the applicant 
was a driver for Air fax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was 
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could 
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he 
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His 
employer told him to finish unloading/ He apparently was able to 
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently 
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its 
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked 
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room. 
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of x-
rays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to 
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor, 
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest, 
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two 
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging 
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr. 
Bliss, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during 
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor 
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and 
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as 
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc 
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in 
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time." 
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the doctor concluded on February 2, 
1990 that the applicant was "...medically stable for return to 
limited employment in nonlaboring activity." Id., at 26. 
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the 
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant 
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the 
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency 
room for treatment. The doctor explained this episode as an 
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general 
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the 
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor 
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant 
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a 
student. 
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant 
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experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms 
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant 
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode 
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's 
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant 
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises. 
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the 
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS 
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with 
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the 
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter) 
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have 
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr. 
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded 
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial 
in nature. The doctor concluded that additional medical 
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the 
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in 
connection with the 1989 injury...." Exhibit D-l at 67. 
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of 
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that 
the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic 
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit 
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that 
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the 
opinion of Dr. Wageman. 
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his 
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical 
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in 
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing 
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial 
accident. Thus, the applicant has failed to show medical and legal 
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel is 
necessary. 
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be 
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims 
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to 
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from 
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be 
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 
1986). 
The applicant's argument that he was still within the 
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six 
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has 
had numerous diagnostic tests completed* None of the specialists 
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that 
surgery is warranted or possible. Dr. Holbrook, for example, 
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were 
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was 
complete. 
This case is complicated by the applicants pre-existing 
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced 
upon him by AIDS. In addition, the applicant suffered two 
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be 
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicants 
continuing back problems. 
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating, 
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since 
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate 
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr. 
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously 
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant 
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We 
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for 
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment, Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by 
the American Medical Association. 
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his 
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported 
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic. We need some 
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In 
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any 
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had 
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the 
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard. 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings, 
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence 
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were 
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82,53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
dmul\{\U^ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
X. 
Colleen S. Colton «^ _ 
Certified this^/^/^day of 
ATTEST: 
Commissioner 
.^JyS 1992. 
^^3^^v ^ J (1/ .* 
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August 21, 1992, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion For Review in the case of Denis Ashcroft was 
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Bruce Wilson 
290 East 4000 North 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Michael Dyer 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Denis Ashcroft 
330 South Mian 
St. George UT 84770 
Liberty Mutual Insurance 
P. 0. Box 45440 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0440 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Legal Assistant 
R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1 . One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1 . The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
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Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P. 0 . Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
(801) 530-6800 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
(to be completed by treating physician) 
EVALUATION FOR: 
DATE OF INJURY: EMPLOYER: 
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? What date? 
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? What date? 
3. Applicant was required to be off work from to 
4. Has applicant a permanent injury? If so, describe fully: 
5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach a final state of recovery? 
6. If there is a permanent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms of percentage of loss of function: 
7. Is there a medically demonstrative casual relationship between the industrial accident and the problems you 
have been treating? . Please explain as necessary: 
8. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the industrial accident? 
9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to previously existing conditions, 
whether due to accidental injury, disease of congenital causes? 
!0. What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from all causes and conditions, including 
industrial injury? 
11. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existing condition? Please explain as necessary. 
Dated this day of , 19 
Physician's Name (please print) Physician's Specialty 
Physician's Signature Street Address 
City/State/Zip Physician's Telephone Number 
